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ABSTRACT
Autonomous agents with negotiation competence
are becoming increasingly important and pervasive.
This paper follows an interdisciplinary approach to
build autonomous negotiating agents by considering
both game-theoretic techniques and bargaining
procedures from the social sciences. The paper
presents a generic model that handles bilateral
multi-issue negotiation, describes equilibrium
strategies for the bargaining game of alternating
offers, and formalizes important strategies used by
human negotiators. Autonomous agents equipped
with the model are able to negotiate under both
complete and incomplete information, thereby
making them very compelling for automated
negotiation.
INTRODUCTION
Automated negotiation systems with computational
agents representing individuals or organizations and
capable of reaching mutually beneficial agreements
are becoming increasingly important and pervasive.
Examples, to mention a few, include the business
trend toward agent-based supply chain management,
the pivotal role that electronic commerce is
increasingly assuming in many organizations, and
the industrial trend toward virtual enterprises.
Artificial intelligence (AI) researchers have
paid some attention to automated negotiation
over the last years and a number of models
have been proposed in the literature. These
models can be classified into three main
classes (Jennings et al. 01):
• game-theoretic models − provide clear analysis
of specific negotiation situations and precise
results concerning the optimal strategies
negotiators should choose, i.e., the strategies
that maximize the negotiation outcome (see,
e.g., Kraus 01, Fatima et al. 06);
• heuristic models − provide general guidelines to
assist negotiators and beneficial strategies for
moving toward agreement, i.e., strategies that
lead to good (rather than optimal) outcomes
of negotiation (see, e.g., Lopes et al. 04,
Li et al. 06);
• argumentation-based models − allow negotiators
to argue about their mental attitudes during
the negotiation process. Thus, in addition to
submitting proposals, negotiators can provide
arguments either to justify their negotiation
stance or to persuade other negotiators to
change their negotiation stance (see, e.g.,
Rahwan et al. 04).
Game-theoretic models have some highly desirable
properties, such as Pareto efficiency and the ability
to guarantee convergence. However, most models
make the following restrictive assumptions: (i) the
agents are rational, (ii) the set of candidate solutions
is fixed and known by all the agents, and (iii) each
agent knows either the other agents’ payoffs
for all candidate solutions or the other agents’
potential attitudes toward risk and expected-utility
calculations.
Heuristic models are typically based on informal
models of interaction and negotiation from the
social sciences. They exhibit the following desirable
features: (i) are based on realistic assumptions, and
(ii) make use of moderate computational resources
to find acceptable solutions. However, most models
have a number of limitations. Firstly, they lack
a rigorous theoretical underpinning − they are
essentially ad hoc in nature. Secondly, they often
lead to outcomes that are sub-optimal. Finally, they
need extensive evaluation.
Argumentation-based models attempt mainly
to marry the exchange of offers with the
exchange of arguments. This permits great
flexibility since, for instance, it makes possible
to persuade agents to change their view of an
offer during the course of negotiation. However,
most models make considerable demands on any
implementation, mainly because they appeal to
very rich representations of the agents and their
environments.
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Against this background, this paper follows
an interdisciplinary approach to build agents
with negotiation competence. Its main purpose
is to present a generic model of negotiation for
autonomous agents. The model handles bilateral
multi-issue negotiation, describes equilibrium
strategies for the bargaining game of alternating
offers, and formalizes a set of negotiation strategies
frequently used by human negotiators.
Thus, this paper uses both game-theoretic
techniques and negotiation procedures from the
social sciences as a basis to develop autonomous
negotiating agents. On the one hand, it considers
two fully informed agents about the various
aspects of the bargaining game of alternating offers
and employs game-theoretic techniques to define
equilibrium strategies. On the other hand, it
considers two incompletely informed agents and
formalizes important strategies studied in the social
sciences (a fruitful area for future work will be to
evaluate the effectiveness of these strategies in a
number of different situations).
The remainder of the paper is structured as
follows. The next section presents the key features
of a generic model of negotiation for autonomous
agents. In particular, we describe the negotiation
protocol and the preferences of the negotiators,
present equilibrium strategies for the bilateral
multi-issue bargaining game of alternating offers,
and introduce a number of concession strategies
and their associated tactics. Following this, we
discuss related work, present concluding remarks,
and outline a number of issues which require further
investigation.
THE NEGOTIATION MODEL
Negotiation is usually understood as proceeding
through three distinct phases (Lewicki et al. 03): a
beginning or initiation phase, a middle or problem-
solving phase, and an ending or resolution phase.
The initiation phase focuses on preparation and
planning for negotiation and is marked by each
party’s efforts to posture for positions. The
problem-solving phase seeks a solution for the
dispute and is characterized by movement toward
a final agreement. The resolution phase focuses on
implementing the final agreement.
Effective preparation and planning involves the
creation of a well-laid plan specifying the activities
that negotiators should attend to before starting to
negotiate. That plan, and the confidence derived
from it, is often a critical factor for achieving
negotiation objectives. Accordingly, we describe
below various activities that negotiators make efforts
to perform in order to carefully prepare and plan
for negotiation (see Lopes et al. 02, for an in-depth
discussion).
Let Ag={ag1, ag2} be the set of autonomous
negotiating agents. Let Agenda={is1, . . . , isn} be
the negotiating agenda − the final set of issues
to be deliberated. Effective planning requires that
negotiators prioritize the issues. In this work,
priorities are set by ranking-order the issues, i.e.,
by defining the most important, the second most
important, and so on. The priority pril of an agent
agi∈Ag for each issue isl∈Agenda is a number
that represents its order of preference. The weight
wil of isl is a number that represents its relative
importance.
Effective planning also requires that negotiators
define two key points for each issue at stake: the
limit or reservation price and the target point or
level of aspiration. The limit is the point where a
negotiator decides that it should stop to negotiate,
because any settlement beyond this point is not
minimally acceptable. It is set by determining
realistic alternatives to a negotiated agreement and
selecting the best alternative. The target point is
the point where a negotiator realistically expects
to achieve a settlement. It is set by first defining
the limit and then brainstorming about what can
be realistically possible. The limit of agi for isl is
denoted by limil and the target point by trgil.
Additionally, effective planning requires that
negotiators agree on an appropriate protocol that
defines the rules governing the interaction. The
protocol can be simple, allowing agents to exchange
only proposals. Alternatively, the protocol can be
sophisticated, allowing agents to provide arguments
to support their negotiation stance. As noted, most
sophisticated protocols make considerable demands
on any implementation. Thus, in this work we
consider a simple protocol (see subsection “The
Negotiation Protocol”).
Finally, effective planning requires that
negotiators be able to select appropriate
strategies that account for their individual
actions. Negotiation strategies can reflect a
variety of behaviours and lead to strikingly different
outcomes. Some strategies are in equilibrium,
meaning that no designer will benefit by building
agents that use any other strategies when it is known
that some agents are using equilibrium strategies.
Thus, for some situations of complete information,
the agents can be designed to adopt equilibrium
strategies (see subsection “Equilibrium Strategies”).
However, for situations of incomplete information,
the problem of strategic choice is rather complex.
In these situations, many bargaining models
have different equilibria sustained by different
assumptions on what an individual in the game
would believe if its opponent took an action
that it was not supposed to take in equilibrium.
Hence, our study differs from this line of work.
As stated, we address the challenge of building
agents that are able to negotiate under incomplete
information by formalizing relevant strategies used
by human negotiators and empirically evaluating
the effectiveness of these strategies in different
situations (see subsection “Concession Strategies
and Tactics”).
At this stage, we hasten to add an explanatory
and cautionary note. This paper primarily focuses
on the problem-solving phase of negotiation. Most
AI researchers have also focused on this phase
of negotiation and have addressed various issues
associated with the design of negotiation protocols
and strategies. Their work has resulted in some
advances in automated negotiation, but it is clear
that much more research still needs to be performed.
At present, the deployment of agents that are able
to negotiate under both complete and incomplete
information is still in its infancy.
The Negotiation Protocol
The protocol is an alternating offers protocol
(Osborne and Rubinstein 90). Two agents or
players, ag1 and ag2, bargain over the division of
the surplus of n≥2 issues (or goods). The players
determine an allocation of the issues by alternately
proposing offers at times in T = {1, 2, . . .}. This
means that one offer is made per time period t∈T ,
with an agent, say agi, offering in odd periods
{1, 3, . . .}, and the other agent agj offering in even
periods {2, 4, . . .}.
The negotiation procedure, labelled the “joint-
offer procedure”, involves bargaining over the
allocation of the entire endowment stream at once.
An offer is a vector (x1, . . . , xn) specifying a
division of the n goods. Once an agreement is
reached, the agreed-upon allocations of the goods
are implemented. This procedure permits agents
to exploit the benefits of trading-off concessions on
their less preferred goods for concessions by their
opponent on the more preferred goods.
The players’ preferences are modelled by assuming
that each player agi discounts future payoffs at
some given rate δti , 0<δ
t
i<1, (δ
t
i is referred to
as the discount factor and the preferences as time
preferences with a constant discount rate). The cost
of bargaining derives from the delay in consumption
implied by a rejection of an offer. Practically
speaking, the justification for this form of preferences
takes into account the fact that money today can be
used to make money tomorrow.
Let Ui be the payoff function of agi. For simplicity
and tractability, we assume that Ui is separable in all
their arguments and that the per-period delay costs
are the same for all issues:
Ui(isi1, . . . , isin, t) = δ
(t−1)
i
n∑
l=1
wil uil(isil)
where wil is the weight of an issue isil and uil is the
component payoff function for isil, i.e., the function
that gives the payoff that agi assigns to a value
of isil. The function uil is a continuous, strictly
monotonic, and linear function. The distinguish
feature of time preferences with a constant discount
rate is the linearity of the function uil. The payoff
of disagreement is normalized at 0 for both players.
Equilibrium Strategies
Game theory can provide sound design principles
for computer scientists. Consider two fully
informed players bargaining over four distinct goods
{X1, . . . , X4}. Each good is modelled as an interval
[0, 1] (or as a divisible pie of size 1). The players’
preferences are as follows:
Ui = δ
(t−1)
i (a x1 + b x2 + x3 + x4)
Uj = δ
(t−1)
j [(1−x1) + (1−x2) + c(1−x3) + d (1−x4)]
where xl, l=1, . . . , 4, denotes the share of agi for
each pie. The parameters a, b, c, and d allow the
marginal utilities of the players to differ across issues
and players. We consider a > b>1 and d>c>1,
i.e., agi places greater emphasis on goods X1 and
X2 while agj values goods X3 and X4 more. Also,
we consider that δi and δj are close to 1 and
the parameters a, b, c, and d are close to one
another. Let pt−1j→i and p
t
i→j denote the offers that
agj proposes to agi in period t−1 and agi proposes to
agj in period t, respectively. Consider the following
strategies for agi and agj :
str∗i =
{
offer (1, 1, x∗i3, 0) if agi’s turn
if Ui(p
t−1
j→i)≥U∗i accept else reject if agj ’s turn
str∗j =
{
offer (1, x∗j2, 0, 0) if agj ’s turn
if Uj(p
t
i→j)≥U∗j accept else reject if agi’s turn
where U∗i =Ui(1, x
∗
j2, 0, 0), U
∗
j =Uj(1, 1, x
∗
i3, 0),
and the shares are the following:
x∗i3=
δiδj(a+b)−δj(a+b+bc+bd)+bc+bd
bc−δiδj and x
∗
j2 =
δi(δiδj(a+b)−δj(a+b+bc+bd)+bc+bd)+(bc−δiδj)(aδi+bδi−a)
b(bc−δiδj) .
Remark 1. For the two-sided four-issue bargaining
game of alternating offers with an infinite horizon,
in which the players’ preferences are as described
above, the pair of strategies (str∗i , str
∗
j ) form an
equilibrium. The outcome is the following:
x∗1 = 1, x
∗
2 = 1, x
∗
4 = 0,
x∗3 =
δiδj(a+ b)− δj(a+ b+ bc+ bd) + bc+ bd
bc− δiδj
Agreement is immediately reached with no delay.
The outcome is Pareto optimal. Letting δi→1 and
δj→1, the equilibrium division is (1, 1, 0, 0).
The formal proof is based on the familiar necessary
conditions for equilibrium: agi is indifferent between
waiting one period to have its offer accepted
and accepting agj ’s offer immediately, and agj is
indifferent between waiting one period to have its
offer accepted and accepting agi’s offer immediately.
Let x∗i = (x
∗
i1, . . . , x
∗
i4) and x
∗
j =(x
∗
j1, . . . , x
∗
j4) be the
equilibrium proposals of agi and agj , respectively.
The problem for agi is to find an offer that maximizes
its payoff (because it is a payoff maximizer) subject
to being acceptable to its opponent, i.e.,
maximize:
Ui(x1, . . . , x4, t) = δ
(t−1)
i (ax1 + bx2 + x3 + x4)
subject to:
(1−x∗i1)+(1−x∗i2)+c(1−x∗i3)+d(1−x∗i4) =
δj [(1−x∗j1)+(1−x∗j2)+c(1−x∗j3)+d(1−x∗j4)]
0 ≤ x∗il ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x∗jl ≤ 1, for l=1, . . . , 4
The problem for agj is stated in a similar way and
is omitted. Solving both maximization problems
yields the outcome specified in the statement of the
Remark. In the limit, letting δi→1 and δj→1,
the outcome of the equilibrium is (1, 1, 0, 0). This
outcome is on the Pareto frontier and corresponds
to the utility pair (a+b, c+d).
Now, consider two fully informed players
bargaining over n distinct goods {X1, . . . , Xn}.
Again, each good is modelled as a divisible
pie of size 1. We consider that the players
set different weights for the goods such that:
wi1/wj1 > wi2/wj2 > . . . > win/wjn.
Remark 2. The bilateral multi-issue bargaining
game of alternating offers with an infinite horizon,
in which the players’ preferences are as described
above, has an equilibrium. The outcome is Pareto
optimal:
(x∗1, . . . , x
∗
k−1, x
∗
k, x
∗
k+1, . . . , x
∗
n) = (1, . . . , 1, s, 0, . . . , 0)
where x∗l , l=1, . . . , n, denotes the share of agi for
each divisible pie. The constant s represents the
share of agi for the Xk pie.
The formal proof is also based on the
familiar necessary conditions for equilibrium.
In short, consider that x∗i =(x
∗
i1, . . . , x
∗
in) and
x∗j =(x
∗
j1, . . . , x
∗
jn) represent the equilibrium
proposals of players agi and agj , respectively. The
problem for agi is stated as follows:
maximize:
Ui(x1, . . . , xn, t) = δ
(t−1)
i
n∑
l=1
wil xl
subject to:
Uj(x
∗
i1, . . . , x
∗
in, t) = Uj(x
∗
j1, . . . , x
∗
jn, t+1)
0 ≤ x∗il ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x∗jl ≤ 1, for l=1, . . . , n
This maximization problem is similar to the
continuous knapsack problem and solvable by a
greedy approach (see, e.g., Martello and Toth 90).
First, agi gives away the maximum possible share
of the issue with the lowest ratio of weights. If the
supply of that issue is exhausted, it gives away the
maximum possible share of the issue with the next
lowest ratio of weights, and so forth until agj gets
the utility of Uj(x∗j1, . . . , x
∗
jn, t+1). The problem
for agj is also analogous to the continuous knapsack
problem and solvable by a greedy approach.
Concession Strategies and Tactics
Human negotiation practice can provide rules-
of-thumb to agent designers. Consider two
incompletely informed agents bargaining over n
distinct issues {is1, . . . , isn}. For convenience, each
issue isl is modelled as an interval [minl,maxl]. The
agents’ preferences are as defined in the subsection
“The Negotiation Protocol”.
The opening stance (or position) and the pattern
of concessions are two central elements of real-
world negotiation. Three different opening positions
(extreme, reasonable and modest) and three levels
of concession magnitude (large, moderate and
small) are commonly discussed in the literature
(Lewicki et al. 03, Pruitt and Kim 04). They can
lead to a number of concession strategies, notably:
• starting high and conceding slowly − negotiators
adopt an optimistic opening attitude and make
successive small concessions;
• starting reasonable and conceding moderately −
negotiators adopt a realistic opening attitude
and make successive moderate concessions.
These strategies are implemented through a variety
of tactics. The terms “strategy” and “tactic” differ
in scope − a tactic is a short-term move designed to
enact a high-level strategy.
Let ptn−1j→i be the offer that agj has proposed to agi
in period tn−1. Likewise, let ptni→j be the offer that
agi is ready to propose in the next time period tn.
The formal definition of a generic concession strategy
follows.
Definition 1. Let agi∈Ag be a negotiating agent.
A concession strategy for agi is a function that
specifies either the tactic to apply at the beginning of
negotiation or the tactic that defines the concessions
to be made during the course of negotiation:
s=

apply tactt1i if agi’s turn and t=1
apply tactti if agi’s turn and t>1
if Ui(p
tn−1
j→i )≥Ui(ptni→j) accept else reject if agj ’s turn
where tactt1i is an opening negotiation tactic and
tactti is a concession tactic. ”
The two concession strategies are defined by
considering different tactics. For instance, the
“starting reasonable and conceding moderately”
strategy is defined by: “tactt1i =starting realistic”
and “tactti= moderate”.
Opening negotiation tactics are functions that
specify the initial values for each issue isl at stake.
The following three tactics are commonly used in
real-life negotiations (Lewicki et al. 03):
• starting optimistic − specifies a value far from
the target point;
• starting realistic− specifies a value close to the
target point;
• starting pessimistic − specifies a value close to
the limit.
The definition of the tactic “starting realistic”
follows (the definition of the other two tactics is
essentially identical, and is omitted).
Definition 2. Let agi∈Ag be a negotiating agent
and isl∈Agenda a negotiation issue. Let trgil be
the target point of agi for isl. The tactic starting
realistic for agi is a function that takes isl and trgil
as input and returns the initial value v[isl]t1i of isl:
starting realistic(isl, trgil) = v[isl]t1i
where v[isl]t1i ∈[ trgil−, trgil+] and >0 is small. ”
Concession tactics are functions that compute new
values for each issue isl. The following five tactics
are commonly used (Lewicki et al. 03):
• stalemate − models a null concession on isl;
• tough − models a small concession on isl;
• moderate − models a moderate concession;
• soft − models a large concession;
• accommodate − models a complete concession.
The definition of a generic concession tactic follows
(without loss of generality, we consider that agi
wants to maximize isl).
Definition 3. Let agi∈Ag be a negotiating agent,
isl∈Agenda a negotiation issue, and limil the limit
of isl. Let v[isl]ti be the value of isl offered by agi at
t. A concession tactic for agi is a function that takes
v[isl]ti, limil and the concession factor Cf∈ [0, 1] as
input and returns the new value v[isl]t+2i of isl:
concession tactic(v[isl]ti, limil,Cf ) = v[isl]
t+2
i
where v[isl]t+2i = v[isl]
t
i−Cf (v[isl]ti−limil). ”
The five tactics are defined by considering different
values for Cf . In particular, the stalemate tactic
by Cf =0, the accommodate tactic by Cf =1, and
the other three tactics by different ranges of values
for Cf (e.g., the tough tactic by Cf ∈ ]0.00, 0.05],
the moderate tactic by Cf ∈ ]0.05, 0.10], and the soft
tactic by Cf ∈ ]0.10, 0.15]).
RELATED WORK
AI researchers have developed a number of
negotiation models incorporating specific protocols
and libraries of negotiation strategies (see, e.g.,
Kraus 01, Lopes et al. 04, Fatima et al. 06,
Li et al. 06). However, despite these and other
relevant pieces of work, we are aware of no similar
efforts to define strategies as functions that specify
the tactics to be used at every period of negotiation.
Tactics, in turn, are defined as functions that
specify the short-term moves to be made throughout
negotiation. Also, we are particularly interested
in both equilibrium strategies that lead to Pareto
optimal outcomes and important strategies studied
in the social sciences and frequently used by human
negotiators.
CONCLUSION
This article has followed an interdisciplinary
approach and has used both game-theoretic
techniques and negotiation procedures from the
social sciences as a basis to develop autonomous
negotiating agents. It has presented a model that
handles bilateral multi-issue negotiation, describes
equilibrium strategies for the bargaining game of
alternating offers, and formalizes a set of human
negotiation strategies. Our aim for the future is:
(i) to extend the model, (ii) to empirically evaluate
the model, and (iii) to use game-theoretic techniques
as a basis to develop autonomous agents that are
able to negotiate under incomplete information.
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